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What drives mandatory and voluntary risk reporting variations across Germany, the UK and 
the US?  
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper utilises computerised textual analysis to explore the extent to which both firm and country 
characteristics influence mandatory and voluntary risk reporting (MRR and VRR) variations both within 
and between non-financial firms across Germany, the UK and the US, over the period from 2005 to 
2010. We find significant variations in MRR and VRR between firms across the three countries. 
Further, we find, on average, that German firms tend to disclose significantly higher (lower) levels of 
risk information mandatorily than UK (US) firms. German firms, on average, tend to reveal 
considerably higher (lower) levels of VRR than US (UK) firms. Our results document that MRR and 
VRR variations are significantly influenced by systematic risk, the legal system and cultural values. 
We also find that country and firm characteristics have higher explanatory power over the observed 
variations in MRR than over those in VRR.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the extent to which firm and country characteristics explain variations in 
mandatory risk reporting (MRR) and voluntary risk reporting (VRR), both within and between non-
financial firms across Germany, the UK and the US during the period from 2005 to 2010. Seeking 
factors (firm and country characteristics) that interpret variations in MRR and VRR across the three 
countries answers the calls of  Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Dobler, Lajili, and Zeghal (2011) 
regarding extant gaps in the current body of  literature on risk reporting. Each of  these countries 
exhibits a distinctive approach to risk reporting. The first approach (Germany’s) is underpinned by a 
significant emphasis on MRR. The second (the UK’s) emphasises voluntary rather than mandatory risk 
reporting. The third approach (that of  the US) represents a compromise between the UK and German 
approaches.  
Consistent with Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) and (2012), MRR expresses the risk 
information that firms exhibit within or above, but still related to, risk regulations that set the minimum 
requirements. VRR expresses any other information about risk included in the narrative sections of  
annual reports. We measure MRR and VRR with a computer-based approach using QSR version 6, 
searching the text and counting the number of  statements that indicate risk.1 Automated risk reporting 
scores are validated manually and statistically to ensure their reliability. Firm characteristics are captured 
by firm risk levels and some control variables. First, based on the literature examining the association 
between market and accounting risk measures (e.g., Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes, 1970; Ecker, Francis, 
Olsson, and Schipper, 2009), we include both market risk measures (market returns volatility, beta and 
volatility of  the standard error of  the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) as measures of  total, 
systematic and unsystematic risk, respectively) and accounting risk measures (leverage and current ratio 
                                                 
1 QSR is a qualitative research software developed for analysing textual data. It has introduced many pieces of 
software such as NUD*IST in its various versions (1 to 6), which it was later upgraded to NVivo. Our paper relies on QSR 
NUD*IST version 6, henceforth QSR version 6. NUD*IST stands for Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing, 
Searching and Theorizing. One of the key advantages of using QSR version 6 over NVivo is the flexibility of choosing the 
unit of coding, as desired, to be either a sentence, a line or a paragraph. Our paper uses the sentence as the unit of analysis 
to avoid the double-counting problem (Kravet and Muslu, 2013), which is a weakness inherent in other dictionary-based 
software programs (e.g., General Inquiry). For a recent review see Li (2010). 
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as measures of  financing and liquidity risks, respectively). Based on the literature looking at variations in 
disclosure practices (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Jaggi and Low, 2000; 
Hope, 2003), we utilise legal systems and cultural values to capture the country characteristics.  
For both the level 1 (within firms) and level 2 (between firms) analyses, we apply repeated measures 
multilevel analysis (Hox, 2010; Dong and Stettler, 2011) in order to capture variations in MRR and VRR 
and then associate those variations to firms’ risk levels. This analysis combines cross-sectional with 
time-series data, and accounts for residual dependency (Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2010). 
Although considerable attention has been paid to risk reporting recently, the majority of  the 
research focuses on a single country (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Li, 2008), or is heavily restricted to 
one category of  risk reporting (e.g., foreign exchange rate disclosure (Marshall and Weetman, 2002, 
2007), MRR (Li, 2008) or aggregated risk reporting (Linsley and Shrives, 2006)). None of  this research 
takes as its principal aim the examination of  how and to what extent underlying risk levels influence the 
different levels of  risk reporting firms exhibit in their annual report narratives, nor does any of  it 
investigate how country-level characteristics influence the nature and extent of  MRR and VRR.  
In a recent and highly relevant piece of  multi-country research, based on 40 manufacturing firms 
from Canada, Germany, the UK and the US in 2005, Dobler et al. (2011) investigate the key 
characteristics of  firms providing aggregated risk disclosure, and their association with the regulations 
in the countries. They do not distinguish, however, between MRR and VRR, although Germany and the 
US are more highly regulated than the UK with respect to risk reporting. This suggests that MRR will 
dominate VRR in both Germany and the US to a much greater extent than in the UK. Their results do 
not support the underpinning argument that firms should respond sensibly to their underlying risks by 
revealing risk information.  
A firm’s choices on whether to engage in disclosure activities are not always directly related or 
restricted to the economic incentives generated by market forces (e.g., Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004; Chen and Roberts, 2010; Judge, Li, and Pinsker, 2010). Neo-institutional theory comprises both 
institutional and market pressures, and explains why firms might vary in their response to regulations or 
even to the best practices among their competitors (e.g., Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Based on this 
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theory, the rational logic behind exhibiting risk information mandatorily and/or voluntarily stems from 
different levels of  pressure generated from regulations and/or best practices, encouraging firms to 
respond so as to meet social norms and be acceptable (e.g., Chen and Report, 2010).  
Our results, based on 3,685 firm-year observations, show significant variations in both MRR and 
VRR within and between firms over 2005 to 2010, across the three countries. We find the variations in 
MRR and VRR to be significantly associated with systematic risk, the legal system and cultural values. 
We also find that the latter two are significantly more essential in explaining variations in MRR than 
VRR.  
This paper makes several contributions to research on risk reporting. First, we observe changes 
over time in both MRR and VRR, and then associate such changes with variations in risk levels 
captured through a comprehensive set of  market and accounting risk measures. Second, to the best of  
our knowledge, we are investigating these associations on the largest set of  data used within risk 
reporting research to date. When we further associate the observed trend in firms’ MRR and VRR with 
the underlying risks in each country, we find signals that either support or warn the German, UK and 
US regulators regarding their approaches to risk reporting. Given that each approach supports a 
particular type of  risk reporting, the extent to which the underlying risks motivate managers to respond 
sensibly by reporting risk information either mandatorily or voluntarily becomes the main criterion for 
assessing the approaches. Finally, based on simultaneous interactions between, and the influence of, 
firm and country characteristics, this paper provides the first empirical evidence of  how corporate risk 
reporting varies within and between firms under the three distinct approaches to risk reporting taken in 
Germany, the UK and the US. The observed pattern of  VRR variations within and between firms 
across these countries differs from the variations in MRR. This conclusion has theoretical and practical 
implications: 
Theoretically, either general disclosure research or risk reporting research might usefully 
distinguish between the trends in mandatory and voluntary risk reporting, avoiding the 
misinterpretations due to relying on the aggregated disclosure score, so as to draw conclusions about 
either VRR or MRR. In practical terms, the higher ability of  legal and cultural values to explain MRR 
5 
 
variations across countries than VRR variations, the latter being significantly more correlated to firm 
characteristics, has implications for the current efforts towards international convergence. In essence, 
any attempt to minimise differences in risk reporting practices should take each country’s legal system 
and cultural values into consideration.   
The remainder of  the paper is organised as follows: The following section discusses the 
theoretical background. Section 3 introduces relevant prior literature and develops the hypotheses. 
Section 4 explains the research methods. The results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 provides 
conclusions, discusses limitations and suggests areas for future research. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
The neo-institutional theory suggests that an organisation seeks to gain legitimacy through institutional 
and market pressures within their business environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995:25). 
In this theory, firms are considered part of a social system that interacts with the society, and they aim 
to reduce uncertainty and ensure survival and growth (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Chen and Report, 
2010). The neo-institutional theory argues that an organisation, as a community group, encompasses 
three main pillars: regulative, mimetic and normative (Scott, 1995:35). These pillars generate pressures to 
which individual organisations respond. Organisational adoption of risk regulations and/or best 
practices might vary due to competition, institutional environments, and the intensity of those 
environments. Responses to such factors shape organisations’ decisions on whether to withhold or 
reveal risk information, mandatorily and/or voluntarily. While those decisions might be dominated by 
one particular pillar (pressure), the others are likely to work alongside it (e.g., Judge, Douglas, and 
Kutan, 2008). Consistent with that, the preference towards exhibiting risk information either 
mandatorily (the German and US approaches) or voluntarily (the UK approach) does not eliminate the 
role of voluntary or mandatory risk disclosure in those countries, respectively.  
These three institutional pressures, regulative, mimetic and normative, create an institutional context 
for firms’ disclosure, where managers can engage in more mandatory and/or voluntary disclosure. The 
regulative or coercive pressure encourages managers to comply with mandatory risk disclosure, while the 
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mimetic and/or normative pressures generate more engagement with voluntary risk disclosure. Compliance 
with risk regulations, though, might require firms to disclose more risk information voluntarily so as to 
clarify different aspects, as regulations can be ambiguous or context-neutral (Weaver, Trevino, and 
Cochran, 1999). 
  Principally, regulative or coercive pressure, which stems from the legal and political power exerted 
by the state (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott, 1995:35), is likely to affect firms’ decisions to reveal risk 
information mandatorily. Firms’ legal environment is a prime example of such coercive pressure, where 
the authority of the law is normally above the firms’ organisational authority. Recently, there have been 
many changes to the regulations as the legal environment has become more pervasive, requiring 
structural changes from firms to enrich their information environments and meet the demands. With 
these developments, firms are seeking to demonstrate their response to the changes and thus gain 
legitimacy (Chen and Roberts, 2010).  
In Germany, the German Accounting Standards Board (GASB) have published GAS 5, which 
deals with risk reporting, making Germany the only country to have attempted to organise risk 
reporting by formally issuing an accounting standard. GAS 5 emphasises the disclosure of firms’ 
residual risks, especially industrial and market risks, and any other risks having a significant impact on a 
firm’s existence. All disclosure should be made in a specific section of the annual report narrative 
(normally under Risks and Opportunities or Outlook).2 The German approach to risk reporting can be 
summarised as follows: Firstly, GAS 5 is the only formal accounting standard dealing comprehensively 
with both the measurement and disclosure of firms’ risks. Secondly, while GAS 5 formally mandates 
specific requirements for risk reporting, it nevertheless encourages German firms to reveal more risk 
information voluntarily.  
In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) published Financial Reporting 
Release (FRR) No.48 on the market risk of financial instruments in 1997. It deals with how listed firms 
should disclose the market risk of their financial instruments. There are three distinctive aspects of the 
                                                 
2 Despite the fact that listed German firms are formally required to fully adopt the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), the Accounting Standards Committee of Germany (ASCG) explains that German firms shall continue to 
apply GAS where the international accounting principles do not include any requirements. This holds for GAS 5. 
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US approach to risk reporting. First, firms provide either mandatory or voluntary risk information, in 
either quantitative (risk mapping, value at risk and sensitivity analysis) or qualitative formats, with 
particular attention paid to MRR. Second, this approach has influenced previous research on risk 
reporting (the following section provides more details) that principally focuses on associating risk 
reporting (especially the market risk of financial instruments) with either various accounting measures 
(e.g., future earnings and future cash flow) or the qualitative characteristics of financial information 
(e.g., comparability, relevance and reliability).  
Similarly, mimetic pressure, caused by the need to respond to uncertainty by looking at how rivals 
handle such uncertainty, and normative pressure, which arises from professional bodies’ initiatives and 
norms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), are likely to affect firms’ decisions on whether to reveal risk 
information voluntarily. 
 In the UK, the Institute of  Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) has 
produced several non-mandatory publications on risk reporting, discussing how firms can report risk 
information in their annual report narratives (ICAEW, 1997), highlighting the beneficial effects of risk 
disclosure for the cost of capital (ICAEW, 1999), identifying practical problems in disclosing risk 
information, and suggesting improvements (ICAEW, 2011). The main features of the UK approach to 
risk reporting are that (1) VRR is preferred, on the basis that it improves the quality of accounting 
information and reduces the cost of capital, and (2) each firm can identify all of its risks individually and 
accurately rather than having to follow a list of risk types.  
In the following section, the insights from the neo-institutional theory will be incorporated with 
relevant literature in the forming of our hypotheses.   
 
3. Relevant literature and hypothesis development  
3.1. Firm characteristics within Germany, the UK and the US 
3.1.1. Market risk measures and variations in MRR and VRR  
It has been argued that accounting earnings variability has historically been the accounting variable 
most strongly correlated to systematic (non-diversifiable) equity risk (Ryan, 1997). Consequently, it is 
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considered very useful for firms to increase the amount of  information they provide about the sources 
and amount of  this variability; this can be achieved if  they provide more information about fair value 
measurement. According to the CAPM, future corporate cash flows reflect both market-wide and firm-
specific risk. In terms of  the former, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) propose the managers’ 
strategies model as a way to provide risk information, relying on the variance in future cash flows, 
according to the SEC’s requirements for market risk. They conclude that voluntary disclosures affect 
firms’ returns, betas and share prices. In terms of  firm-specific risk, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 
(2012) propose a theoretical model to analyse the consequences of  firms’ mandatory disclosure of  
future cash flow sensitivity. The theoretical model of  Bagnoli and Watts (2007) suggests that the cross-
sectional variations in voluntary disclosure depend on the cross-sectional variations in the market’s 
uncertainty.   
In a recent work, Abraham and Shrives (2014) argue that two competing approaches that might 
explain why firms exhibit risk information in their annual report narratives. The first, the mimetic aspect 
of institutional theory, argues that risk disclosure is likely to be less useful due to managers engaging in 
risk disclosure as a routine activity. Thus, disclosure is likely to be symbolic rather than substantive in 
nature, and, as a consequence, it will not change over time as any change would attract unwelcome 
attention. They further claim that this theory suggests the possible occurrence of decoupling, suggesting 
that real risks are not reflected in risk disclosure. Because disclosure does not reflect reality, there is no 
need for managers to revise it. Based on this theory, firms are unlikely to disclose risk information 
when other companies fail to do so. The second competing approach, the normative aspect of institutional 
theory, argues that risk disclosure should be amended over time as firms’ risks change over time. Risk 
disclosure, therefore, should be discussed in light of the previous year’s disclosure to confirm its 
coherence and authenticity. Based on institutional theory, managers are like to disclose more risk 
information to describe their ex ante risks. 
Consistent with the first approach, Li (2008) finds that US firms providing more disclosures, 
captured through a text search for the words ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’, relating to future risks are more 
likely than other firms to exhibit negative future returns. He concludes that the stock market does not 
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fully reflect, and is thus inefficient in reflecting, the risk content in future earnings. In contrast, Kravet 
and Muslu (2013) find, consistent with the second approach,  that textual risk disclosure on form 10-K 
is likely to increase the investor-perceived risk, as proxied by volatility and beta measuring total and 
systemic risk respectively, suggesting that such disclosure reveals new risk factors to the market. 
Consistent with that, Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele (2014) find that disclosed risk 
information has a significant impact on market value and risk levels, and conclude that risk information 
is firm-specific and useful to investors. They also find that textual risk disclosure in section 1.a (risk 
factors) of  form 10-K is significantly associated with risk levels. 
Similarly, the association between risk levels and risk reporting levels can be hypothesised to be 
either positive or negative (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). A positive relationship may reflect managers in 
higher-risk firms wanting to explain how they manage these higher risks successfully. A negative 
relationship may be rationalised on the basis of  higher-risk firms not wishing to attract market 
attention. Linsley and Shrives (2006), however, find that risk reporting levels reflect firm size more than 
they do firm risk. Likewise, Hill and Short (2009) do not find risk levels to impact significantly on the 
provision of  risk information.  
However, Marshall and Weetman (2002) suggest that higher-risk firms are comparatively more 
likely to disclose risk. Abraham and Cox (2007) also find a positive association between risk levels and 
risk reporting. Elshandidy, Fraser, and Hussainey (2013) reveal that higher-risk firms are more sensitive 
to underlying risk levels in terms of  both MRR and VRR, and that firms exhibiting greater compliance 
with mandatory regulations have a greater propensity to report risk voluntarily. However, Dobler et al. 
(2011) do not find a significant association between firm risk, proxied by beta, and its aggregated risk 
reporting level.  
We argue that firms are likely to respond to the pressure that arises from an increase in risk by 
exhibiting more risk information to meet social expectations and be socially acceptable. Firms will have 
a motive to be consistent with similar firms that respond to high levels of risk by disclosing more risk 
information. This reassures, as a confirmatory role, their investors about their ability to identify and 
manage those risks effectively, raising their status (e.g., Chen and Roberts, 2010). In such a structure, a 
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firm that seeks to be perceived as legitimate is likely to be mimetic and normative. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H1a: Variations in MRR and VRR within and across Germany, the UK and the US are likely to be 
positively associated with firm risk levels (as proxied by market risk measures). 
3.1.2. Accounting risk measures and variations in MRR and VRR  
Prior risk research uses leverage as a proxy for a firm’s risk level (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007; Marshall and Weetman, 2007; Hill and Short, 2009; Elshandidy et al., 2013). 
The results are mixed: Abraham and Cox (2007) and Linsley and Shrives (2006) find no significant 
association between leverage and risk disclosure. Marshall and Weetman (2007) suggest that high-
leverage firms are likely to provide foreign exchange risk disclosure. More recently, Dobler et al. (2011) 
find that high-leverage US firms are likely to provide more risk disclosure in their narratives than high-
leverage German firms. Their findings do not support any influence from leverage on risk disclosure 
for UK firms, however.   
Marshall and Weetman (2007) argue that low-liquidity firms (high liquidity risk) are more 
motivated than other firms to provide higher levels of  risk information. However, their findings 
suggest that high-liquidity firms provide more foreign exchange risk information in order to signal their 
strong position to investors since they are under less critical scrutiny regarding liquidity risk. As a result, 
they are more willing to provide information on their hedge strategies and foreign exchange activities. 
Hill and Short (2009) find that high-leverage and low-liquidity firms disclose more risk information. 
Elshandidy et al. (2013) find that highly liquid and leveraged firms are more likely to make voluntary 
risk disclosure. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1b: Variations in MRR and VRR within and across Germany, the UK and the US are likely to be 
positively associated with firm risk levels (as proxied by accounting risk measures).  
3.2. Country characteristics  
A sizable amount of  research (e.g., Nobes, 1998; La Porta et al., 1998; Jaggi and Low, 2000; Hope, 
2003; William, 2004; Ding, Hope, Jeanjea, and Stolowy, 2007; Dong and Stettler, 2011) has been 
conducted on factors that might explain international differences in accounting practices. Among the 
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many factors studied, countries’ legal systems and cultural values are claimed to be most essential. 
Based on the neo-institutional theory, Judge et al. (2008) argue that, the stronger are the laws within a 
nation and the more the national culture emphasises competitiveness, the greater is the perceived 
legitimacy of  its governance. On that basis, these institutional characteristics might influence firms’ 
behaviour towards revealing risk information to improve their legitimacy.  
Whether a country belongs to the set of  common law or code law countries is a reflection of  its 
legal origins and determines the level of  detail in its measurement and disclosure practices (e.g., Nobes, 
1998) and investor protection (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998). In common (code) law countries such as the 
US and the UK (Germany), firms tend to be more transparent (secretive) and place a higher priority on 
protecting investors (creditors). Ding et al. (2007) find that the differences observed between domestic 
and international accounting standards are significantly influenced by legal systems, shedding light on 
the latters’ impact, among other institutional factors, on the efforts to adopt a single set of  accounting 
standards across the globe.  
The national culture is another institutional factor that influences both managers’ (preparers’) 
choices and investors’ (users’) preferences regarding financial reporting (e.g., Hope, 2003). Hofstede 
(1991) and (2001) proposes five dimensions that have been used widely in prior accounting research to 
examine the impact of  culture on accounting (for an extensive review see, e.g., Doupnik and Tsakumis, 
2004). These dimensions, defined in Table 1, are power distance (PD), uncertainty avoidance (UA), 
individualism (IND), masculinity (MAS), and long-term orientation (LTO).  
Based on Hofstede’s scores, as shown in Table 1, the US and the UK show some similarities in 
cultural values, but Germany differs somewhat. Specifically, it seems to differ greatly in IND and UA. 
The lower and respectively higher scores for IND and UA in Germany relative to the US and UK 
reflect that the German national culture places more of  a premium on safety, predictability, faithfulness 
to an established system of  rules and regulations, and high conservatism compared to the American 
and British cultures (Haskins et al., 1996: 480). The relatively low scores for PD in Germany and the 
UK suggest that their firms will have a relatively higher preference for authority than individuality, 
compared with US firms. The lower scores for LTO in the British and American cultures than in the 
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German culture indicate the latter’s preference for thrift and large amounts of  savings (Haskins et al., 
1996: 481).   
Ding et al. (2005) provide evidence that cultural values are essential to the harmonisation of  
accounting practices in general. Regarding disclosure practices, Zarzeski (1996) hypothesises and finds 
that all of  Hofstede’s (1991) dimensions to have a significant impact on disclosure, expect for PD.  
Without observing the pattern of  either combining or dis-combining the analysis with legal 
and/or cultural values variables, Williams (2004) finds that firms from common law countries were 
more likely to provide higher disclosure levels of  than firms in code law countries. PD is the only 
cultural dimension that significantly explains the variability in firms’ disclosures. Jaggi and Low (2000), 
however, argue that the cultural factors of  a country have an indirect impact on financial disclosures 
through its legal system, based on prior research on the effect of  legal systems on accounting practices 
(e.g., La Porta et al., 1998). Dong and Stettler (2011) find significant impacts of  both legal system and 
cultural values (with the exception of  UA) on aggregated disclosure.  
Based on Jaggi and Low (2000)’s argument, Hope (2003) provides empirical evidence on the 
importance of  the legal system as a conditioning variable for the role of  cultural values. In his full 
sample, he finds that culture has a limited role in explaining disclosure variability. Once he distinguishes 
common from code law countries, however, he finds that, in the case of  common law countries, all 
cultural dimensions are significantly associated with disclosure. In the case of  code law countries, he 
finds that all cultural variables except PD are significant in explaining the variability of  disclosure.  
In risk disclosure research, Erkens (2012) explains that legal systems are pre-determined and 
emerge as a result of  cultural values, and argues that risk disclosure can be seen as a function of  a 
country’s legal system and its cultural values. He finds that legal systems and cultural values are 
significantly correlated with variations in MRR and VRR. Based on this discussion, we formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: Country characteristics (legal system and cultural values) have explanatory power over the 
observed variations in MRR and VRR across Germany, the UK and the US. 
13 
 
4. Method  
4.1. Data collection and sample selection 
Thomson One Banker is used to obtain a list of  Frankfurt (CDAX), FTSE, and NASDAQ all-share 
firms. As in prior research (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007), financial firms and 
cross-listed firms are excluded due to their distinctive regulations and accounting practices, and to avoid 
dual requirements on risk reporting across countries. These criteria yield a list of  716 German, 339 UK 
and 1,680 US firms. We then re-sample the 1,680 US firms randomly to be consistent with the UK 
sample size. Meanwhile, the existence of  English or English/German annual reports is the main 
criterion used to re-sample the German list so as to avoid any bias caused by comparing different 
languages (Dobler et al., 2011). Additionally, Campbell, Beck, and Shrives (2005) find that annual 
reports translated from German to English convey the same content as the originals.  Accordingly, we 
derive a final sample of  219 German, 339 UK and 320 US firms. 
Annual reports for UK and German firms are collected from either Thomson One Banker or the 
company’s website, and 10-Ks for the US firms are obtained from the historical SEC EDGAR. All 
reports are for financial years ending within the period from 30 June 2005 to 30 June 2010. We focus 
on annual reports since these remain a primary source of  information for investors (see, e.g., 
Elshandidy et al., 2013). The time period reflects IFRS becoming mandatory for UK and German listed 
companies in 2005. 
All annual reports are converted into text files so as to be readable by QSR version 6. We 
therefore exclude annual reports that cannot be converted into text files (15 from German firms, 16 
from UK firms and 15 from US firms). All firms without a complete time series of  both annual reports 
and market data are also excluded (4 German firms, 41 UK and 51 US). The final sample size is 1,000 
German, 1,410 UK and 1,270 US firm-years.  
4.2. Measuring MRR and VRR using automated content analysis 
4.2.1. Automated content analysis  
The process used to measure both MRR and VRR is shown in Figure 1. In order to identify the 
number of  statements indicating risk, we first construct a comprehensive list of  risk-related keywords, 
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relying initially on the risk word list proposed by Elshandidy et al. (2013). Our list contains the 
following: against, catastrophe (catastrophic), challenge (challenges), chance (chances), decline 
(declined), decrease (decreased), differ*, diversify*, fail (failure), fluctuate*, gain (gains), increase 
(increased), less, loss*, low*, peak (peaked), probable*, risk*, shortage, significant*, threat, unable, 
uncertain (uncertainty; uncertainties), reverse (reversed) and viable. Words marked with a * also include 
derivatives of  the original. The words are generated on the basis of  an adopted definition of  the term 
risk as variations or fluctuations around a target value (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006). This definition 
includes both potential gains or opportunities and potential losses, threats or danger.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Second, for the US and Germany, we eliminate all sections indicative of  mandated risk reporting, 
according to the SEC’s requirements in the US (item 1.a for Risk Factor; 7.a for Quantitative and 
Qualitative Disclosure about Market Risk), and GAS 5’s in Germany (the sections on ‘Risks and Opportunities’ 
or ‘Outlook’). While these sections indicate MRR, (denoted MRR_I), according to these requirements, 
there are some possibilities for US and German firms to disclose information about aspects related to 
MRR, (denoted MRR_V), in other annual report narrative sections as well. In these other sections, 
firms mainly provide their VRR, but can also disclose information about risks related to mandated 
themes or topics.3 The following keywords, therefore, cover those mandated themes or topics: 
contingence (ies), derivative or financial instrument(s), fair value(s), foreign currency or foreign 
exchange, investment(s) and segment(s). The total mandatory risk disclosure score in the US and 
Germany is then calculated as the sum of  the total number of  sentences indicating risk (e.g., containing 
any of  the keywords) in the mandated sections and the total number in the other narrative sections of  
the annual report. For UK firms, we search the full annual report to obtain MRR, as there are no 
mandated sections in the UK’s annual report.  
                                                 
3 Although neither the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB), the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) nor the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has published accounting standards specifically on risk 
reporting, the latter is addressed by several accounting standards. Six principal mandated themes or topics related to risk that 
are addressed by the ASB, the IASB and FASB are as follows: contingencies (FRS 12; IAS 37; FAS 5), segment reporting 
(SSAP 25; IFRS 8; FAS 14), foreign exchange (FRS 23; IAS 21; FAS 52), the substance of  transactions or investments (FRS 
5; IAS16; FAS 115),  derivatives (FRS 13, 25, 26, 29; IAS 32, 39 and IFRS 7; FAS 133), and fair value  (FAS 157).  
 
15 
 
We use the special command instructions of  QSR version 6 and design an automated program to 
search for our risk word list. We count all statements containing at least one risk-related word from 
both the mandated annual report sections (the US and Germany only) and the voluntary sections (all 
three countries). Statements of  risk in the voluntary sections are used as a proxy for the firms’ 
aggregated risk reporting scores. To differentiate between voluntary and mandatory statements in the 
full annual reports of  the UK firms, or in the other narrative sections of  the annual reports of  the US 
and German firms, we exclude the total mandatory risk score for UK firms, or MRR_V for the US and 
German firms from the aggregated risk scores to determine VRR for the UK, US and German firms. 
4.2.2. Reliability and validity of  risk reporting scores 
The reliability and validity of  the risk reporting scores are tested in two stages. First, we examine the 
extent to which the final word list captures statements with a risk focus. To this end, we read 30 
randomly selected statements from the QSR version 6 output for 15 firms in each country from the 
year 2007. We find the final risk keyword list to be largely successful (80% on average) in identifying 
statements indicative of  risk in each country. Second, after calculating the final risk reporting scores, we 
carry out two post hoc procedures. In the first, we review the statements from the first stage manually, 
in terms of  the word list’s ability to discriminate between MRR and VRR. We find, based on reviewing 
the aforementioned 30 statements for each of  the 15 firms in each country, that the keywords are able 
to differentiate reasonably between these disclosures in around 77% of  cases (on average).  
 The second test uses Cronbach’s alpha, which provides a statistical measure of  how well a 
dataset captures a particular underlying construct, to validate the MRR and VRR scores. Specifically, it 
indicates the MRR and VRR scores’ consistency and how well they reflect risk disclosure. As a rule, 
Cronbach’s alpha will increase as the inter-correlation among MRR and VRR increases, providing an 
internal consistency estimate of  the reliability of  the risk disclosure scores. The inter-correlations 
among the risk disclosure scores will be maximised when all items measure the same construct. For the 
computed risk reporting scores, Cronbach’s alpha is around 70% for the US and around 85% for the 
UK and Germany, which is acceptable given the generally agreed upon social science measure of  70% 
(e.g., Abraham and Cox, 2007). We conclude that the computed risk reporting scores are reliable. 
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4.3. Empirical model 
We use repeated measures multilevel analysis to associate the firm characteristics (firm risk levels and 
other firm characteristics) and country characteristics (legal system and cultural values) with the 
variations in MRR and VRR within each firm (level 1) over the period from 2005 to 2010, and between 
different firms over these years (level 2), in Germany, the UK and the US.4   
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      (1) 
where RRtij is the risk reporting (MRR or VRR) of firm i in country j in year t. β0ij is the intercept of firm 
i in country j. β1ij and β2ij are the slopes of the time-varying variables applying to firm i in country j. Z tij, 
and Z2tij are the linear and quadratic components of time for firm i in country j at time t. These two 
components are the main parameters at level 1 as shown under the null model and they are given 
according to polynomial curves. 
At level 2 of  the repeated measures analysis, βrq and βoq represent the effects of  Xfl qij on both the 
linear and quadratic components of  time of  MRR and VRR. Xfl qij is a function of  the firm 
characteristics, including risk (total (TR), systematic (SR), unsystematic (USR), financing (FR) and 
liquidity (LR)) and other firm characteristics/controls (firm size (SE), profitability (PE), growth (GE), 
dividends (DE) and industry type (IE)).5  
We control for these effects for a number of  reasons. First, previous research shows firm size to 
be positively associated with general disclosure levels (e.g., Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Chavent, Ding, 
Stolowy, and Wang, 2006). Similarly, Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Abraham and Cox (2007) find 
aggregated and voluntary risk reporting to be significantly and positively correlated with firm size. 
Second, prior studies on general voluntary disclosure (Wallace and Naser, 1995; Chavent et al., 2006) 
suggest that firms with higher profitability may provide comparatively more risk information. Third, 
Khurana, Pereira, and Martin (2006) argue that, as disclosure enhances the ability to obtain external 
                                                 
4 This aggregate equation combines levels 1 and 2, where level 1 variations occur within firms as a function of  time 
and standard error, and level 2 variations occur between firms, based on the direct impact of  the firm indicators on the 
intercept and growth rate. 
5 For firm characteristics, we use a rank transformation for all variables proxied by ratios (TR, SR, USR, FR, LR, PE, 
GE, and DE) to improve the distribution of  these ratio variables, as suggested by much of  the prior research (e.g., Conover 
and Iman, 1980; Baginski and Wahlen, 2003).  
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financing by reducing information asymmetry, firm growth is likely to raise disclosure levels. This is 
supported by their empirical evidence, and that of  Chavent et al. (2006). Fourth, empirical research 
(e.g., Deshmukh, 2005; Li and Zhao, 2008) carried out in the US finds that firms characterised by low 
information asymmetry are more likely to pay higher dividends. Wang and Hussainey (2013) reveal a 
positive association between future-oriented information and dividends, for UK firms. Lastly, firms 
from the same industry are likely to make similar levels of  disclosure; when firms act inconsistently 
with industry expectations, the market might perceive them to be concealing either important 
information or bad news. Prior research on both general (Beattie, McInnes, and Fearnley, 2004; Dong 
and Stettler, 2011) and risk (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Erkens, 2012) disclosure finds empirical evidence 
that the disclosure level varies across industries. Additionally, and consistent with Kravet and Muslu 
(2013), we control for the length of  the annual reports by including a model with the total number of  
sentences in the annual report.  
βcq stands for the effects of Xcl qij in code law (and respectively low cultural score) countries 
relative to those in common law (and high cultural score) countries (as the reference groups) on the 
linear and quadratic components of time of MRR and VRR. Xcl qij is a function of the country 
characteristics, namely, legal system and cultural values. Table 1 explains the definitions of these 
variables, their sources and their codes. εtij and rij are the standard errors of level 1 and level 2, 
respectively.6 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 2, which reports descriptive statistics of  the main variables for Germany, the UK, and the US, 
suggests that, on average, US firms exhibit higher levels of  MRR than UK (by 37%) and German (by 
                                                 
6 The error structure at either level 1 (εtij) or level 2 (rij) is an essential consideration in all of  the above equations. The 
error or residual of  level 1 is the variability between the estimated and actual values of  MRR/VRR within firms over time. 
The error structure of  level 2 (ri), however, can be explicitly reflected through a random effect at that level, which, in turn, 
might contain a random intercept, a random linear slope and covariance between the intercept and the linear slope. In order 
to test whether and the extent to which the residuals either lack normality or are influenced by outliers, we carry out some 
further checks. The Q-Q plot for standardised residuals and predicted values of MRR and VRR visually supports the 
validation of the normality assumption. We then use summary statistics for those two variables, namely, by looking at 
whether mean, median and skewness together indicate normality. 
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16%) firms. UK firms, in contrast, exhibit, on average, 3% more VRR than US and 2% more than 
German firms. The results suggest that, in all three jurisdictions, managers have incentives to provide 
extra risk information voluntarily, along with their mandatory disclosures. Managers may combine VRR 
with MRR to maximise risk reporting levels. These results are further confirmed by examining whether 
the observed differences are economically and statistically significant. Both parametric (ANOVA) and 
non-parametric (Kruskal-Wallis) tests, not reported, document significant differences in MRR and VRR 
between firms across the three countries, at a p-value of  0.000, suggesting that, throughout our three-
country sample, firms vary significantly in their levels of  MRR and VRR. 
To break these differences down to comparisons between each pair of  countries, we further 
conducted parametric and non-parametric univariate analyses using the Bonferroni and Mann-Whiteney 
tests, respectively (unreported). The findings suggest that, on average, UK firms are likely to exhibit 
greater levels of  VRR than either US or German firms, at a p-value of  0.000. German firms, though, 
tend to reveal, on average, significantly more information about their risk voluntarily than do US firms, 
at a p-value of  0.000. Based on these results, it seems that in the highly regulated risk reporting country 
of  Germany, firms tend to exhibit, on average, significantly higher levels of  MRR than in the UK, but 
lower levels than in the US; German firms, though, are likely to reveal, on average, significantly higher 
levels of  VRR than US firms. The results also suggest that, US firms, which exhibit significantly higher 
levels of  MRR than UK firms, are also likely to exhibit considerably lower levels of  VRR than UK 
firms. This behaviour can be explained by the US firms wanting to compensate their investors for their 
lower levels of  VRR by increasing their levels of  MRR, which is consistent with the main regulatory 
trend in the US. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In terms of  the comparison between disclosure types in each country, Table 2 also indicates that 
German firms disclose 50% more VRR than MRR on average. This is perhaps surprising, since 
mandatory disclosure might be expected to dominate voluntary in the highly regulated German 
environment. One of  the most likely explanations for this result is that, by adopting GAS 5, the 
German environment is probably encouraging managers to exhibit both a high compliance with the 
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risk regulations and to reveal more voluntary risk information. UK firms disclose, on average, 86% 
more VRR than MRR. As a consequence of  their larger voluntary disclosures, the fluctuations, as 
indicated by the standard deviation, in VRR are higher than those in MRR among the German and UK 
firms.  The US firms exhibit, on average, 16% more MRR than VRR. The fluctuations in MRR are 
twice those in VRR. To examine these observed fluctuations, we again conduct a parametric t-test and a 
non-parametric Mann-Whitney analysis. The unreported results suggest that German and UK (US) 
firms are, on average, likely to reveal more VRR (MRR) than MRR (VRR), at a p-value of  0.000.7 These 
results are consistent with our main conclusions derived earlier from the descriptive statistics.  
The above results indicate that managers in highly regulated environments, such as the US, have 
motives to reveal risk information, essentially through the approach desired by the regulators (MRR), 
and then may maximise their overall reporting through the other form of  disclosure (VRR). Managers 
in less regulated environments, such as the UK, meanwhile, are highly motivated to reveal risk 
information, essentially through the approach desired by the regulators (VRR), and then may maximise 
their overall reporting through the other form of  disclosure (MRR). When dealing with a formal risk 
reporting standard, as in Germany, managers use both forms to maximise their overall disclosure as a 
response to risk levels. 
The above discussion highlights the interaction between mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosures, and suggests that these two forms are likely to be complements rather than substitutes for 
one another. Consistent with this conclusion, when MRR is regressed on VRR, and vice versa, our 
results (not reported) suggest, first, ceteris paribus, that German and UK (US) firms tend to use VRR 
significantly to complement (substitute for) MRR. Second, our results suggest, ceteris paribus, that 
German and UK (US) firms tend to use MRR significantly to complement (substitute for) VRR. These 
findings are consistent with Bagnoli and Watts (2007)’s argument for a complementary rather than 
substitutive relation between mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Their results are in line with 
Einhorn (2005)’s findings that emphasise the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosures.  
                                                 
7 Unreported results are available upon request from the corresponding (principal) author. 
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As can be deduced from Table 3’s Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients, the parametric 
and non-parametric coefficients indicate a significant relation between MRR and VRR, at a p-value of 
0.000.8  This result suggests that managers who exhibit high compliance with risk reporting regulations 
in Germany, the UK and the US have higher incentives to provide high voluntary risk disclosure as 
well. This result is consistent with Elshandidy et al. (2013) and Dye (1986), and supports the theory that 
MRR complements VRR. The significant associations between these two variables and the other 
variables are consistent with prior empirical risk reporting research (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007; Elshandidy et al., 2013). This consistency validates this paper’s MRR and 
VRR scores.             
  [Insert Table 3 about here] 
5.2. Repeated measures multilevel analysis results: Testing H1 and H2  
This section discusses how firm and country characteristics explain variations in MRR and VRR within 
and between firms over the period from 2005 to 2010, across Germany, the UK, and the US, relying on 
repeated measures multilevel analysis. The results are shown in Tables 4 and 5, indicating the value and 
significance of  the coefficients of  all explanatory variables under eight different models. The first (null) 
model shows variations in MRR and VRR from 2005 to 2010 without explanatory variables or 
predictors, serving as a baseline for appraising. Model 1 incorporates the risk variables (TR, SR, USR, 
LR and FR) and control variables (SE, PE, GE, DE, LE, and IE). Models 2 to 6 incorporate the 
abovementioned risk and control variables and the dummy variable for the legal system of  the country 
in question. Each one also includes one of  Hofstede’s five cultural dimensions. Model 7 introduces the 
lagged values of  the market and accounting risk measures, as explained in Section 5.4, to account for 
endogeneity.  
                                                 
8 We checked for multicollinearity statistically by calculating the condition index, which is the square root of  the 
maximum eigenvalue divided by the minimum eigenvalue. If  this index is more than 30, the variable has a severe 
multicollinearity problem (e.g., Gujarati, 2004:365). We checked this, and found that none of the explanatory variables had 
this problem.  
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After that, each table identifies the level 1 and 2 variances, namely, the degree of  risk reporting 
variation at each level based on the intra-class correlation (ICC).9 In order to identify what proportion 
of  the variances in MRR and VRR can be accounted for by the explanatory variables, we calculate 
adjusted-R2 at levels 1 and 2. To assess the accuracy of  any two models, the differences in the -2 Log 
Likelihood (-2LL) between each model and the null model may be considered. A decrease in the 
difference suggests an improvement in the model. The change in the chi-square may be used to 
examine a null hypothesis of  no variations in risk reporting within and between firms over the period 
from 2005 to 2010 across the countries. If  the difference between the -2LL for Model 2 and that for 
the null model is greater than the value of  the change in the chi-square, Model 2 is then statistically 
acceptable. The detailed empirical results are discussed in the following subsections.  
5.2.1. The impact of  firm and country characteristics on MRR variations: Testing H1 and H2 
The null model (Table 4) indicates that 21% of  the MRR variations are variations within the firms 
over time (level 1), whereas 79% of  the MRR variations (78% in the intercept and 1% in time) are 
between the firms (level 2); both of  these results are significant at a p-value of  0.000. This significance 
indicates a possibility of  explaining such variations further by including firm characteristics (risk and 
control factors in Model 1) and country characteristics (legal system and cultural factors in Models 2 to 
6). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Model 1 (Table 4) indicates that both total and unsystematic risks are significantly associated with 
MRR variations, at p-values of  0.038 and 0.017, respectively. This result indicates that the provision of  
MRR is significantly influenced by both firm-specific (unsystematic) and overall (total) risk. The risk 
regulations in these countries do not set a maximum limit on the risk information that should be 
included in firms’ narratives and as those firms might under the regulative pressure as argued by the 
neo-intuitional theory to the extent to which those firms are likely to provide more mandated risk 
information. Our results support Dobler’s (2008) theoretical argument in which he calls for further 
                                                 
9 The ICC is the proportion of  variance in either MRR or VRR at level 1 (within each firm over 2005 to 2010) and at 
level 2 (between the firms in each country) (e.g., Hox, 2010:15). For level 1, the ICC is σ2 level 1/ (σ2   of  level 1+ σ2 of  level 
2); for level 2, the denominator is replaced by the variance of  level 2. 
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research, even within highly regulated countries. In essence, our evidence suggests that managers may 
have incentives to disclose more about their mandated risks, resulting in variations in MRR between 
firms. Investors may require higher rates on their investments in higher-risk firms, and may 
overestimate required rates in the absence of  adequate risk reporting (Healy and Palepu, 2001). As a 
result and consistent with the underpin arguments of  our theoretical framework that managers may 
provide more risk disclosure to reduce investor uncertainty. Our results also suggest that managers of  
highly liquid firms may disclose more about risks included in the mandatory requirements in order to 
be consistent with the best practice, the normative aspect, by informing their investors and 
distinguishing themselves from managers perceived to manage liquidity less effectively (see, e.g., 
Marshall and Weetman, 2007). These findings therefore support H1a rather H1b.   
Regarding the other firm characteristics, Model 1 (Table 4) also indicates that large firms, poorly 
performing firms, and lower-dividend-paying firms are likely to exhibit significantly higher levels of  
MRR. Managers at these firms may have a greater ability to collect and prepare information at a lower 
average cost (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 2001). Managers of  such firms may also have a greater incentive to 
disclose risk information. These results are consistent with prior literature on risk reporting (e.g., 
Miihkinen, 2012; Elshandidy et al., 2013). 
Model 1 (Table 4) also shows that firm characteristics explain 52.2% (adjusted-R2) of  all MRR 
variations between firms across these countries. At the same time, these variations decrease by 25% 
compared to the null model, to 62%, at a p-value of  0.000. The variations in MRR within firms over 
2005 to 2010 increase significantly, compared with the null model, to 35%, at a p-value of  0.000. These 
results therefore suggest that simply considering firm characteristics improves the model’s ability to 
explain the variations in MRR between firms, and reduces the unexplained variations between firms 
across the three countries, rather than the unexplained variances within firms over the five years 
considered. 
In Models 2 to 6, where we consider country characteristics, we find that market-wide risk (a high 
covariance in market returns) is the only risk factor considered that significantly influences firms across 
our three countries, increasing the level of  MRR provided. This result is consistent with the theory and 
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empirical research discussed earlier. Additionally, we find that large, less profitable and high-growth 
firms are likely to provide significantly higher levels of  MRR than other firms, at p-values of  0.000, 
0.011 and 0.051, respectively. The above results suggest that we should accept H1a. 
Under Models 2-6, we find that the legal system and cultural values have a significant influence 
on MRR variations, at p-values of  0.000. The interpretations of  these effects are subject to the 
combination of  legal system and cultural values. Particularly, when we combine a country’s legal system 
and its score for UA, IND, or LTO, we find that firms in the code law country (Germany) exhibit 
significantly higher levels of  MRR than firms in the common law countries (the UK and the US). The 
results also show that a country’s legal system and its UA, IND and LTO scores convey the same 
information, explaining why firms vary in disclosing their MRR. This result indicates that firms from 
countries with higher (lower) UA and LTO (IND) scores, such as Germany, are more likely to provide 
significantly higher MRR than firms from low (high)-score countries. Firms from countries such as 
Germany are likely to provide more information about risk to avoid any possibility of  increasing 
uncertainty about them in the eyes of  investors. Furthermore, firms from countries with lower MAS 
scores, such as the US, are more likely to provide more mandated risk disclosure in their annual report 
narratives than those from high-MAS countries. These results are consistent with the prior empirical 
findings of  Jaggi and Low (2000), Hope (2003) and Erkens (2012). Our results also suggest that, 
holding the legal system constant, PD, UA and LTO have identical impacts on MRR.  
A remarkable improvement occurs in the model’s ability to explain MRR variations once we 
include both legal and cultural exploratory variables. Hence, Models 2 to 6 in Table 4 show that both 
country and firm characteristics can explain around 79.2% of  the MRR variations between German, 
British, and America firms. Including country factors in the model increases (by more than two thirds) 
its ability to explain MRR variation compared to the model including just firm characteristics. This is to 
be expected, because these factors might have a direct impact on each country’s regulations, which in 
turn can be considered a principal determinant of  the mandated risk indicator statements within each 
country, and thus an essential driver of  MRR variations. These results imply that it is essential to 
consider the legal system and cultural values of  a country, due to their significant and direct impact on 
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its mandatory practices. Accordingly, the intention to achieve international convergence, a major goal 
of  the IASB, should be expanded from simply adopting a single set of  high-quality accounting 
standards, the IFRS, to considering the legal systems and cultural values of  countries around the world. 
These findings answer Doupnik and Tsakumis (2004)’s question about the extent to which the culture 
of  a country influences its rules. Finally, these results support H2. 
5.2.2. The impact of  firm and country characteristics on VRR variations: Testing H1 and H2 
The null model (Table 5) shows that approximately 49% (46% in the intercept and 3% in time) of  the 
total variation in VRR is between firms, level 2, over the period from 2005 to 2010. The other 51% of  
the variation is within firms, level 1. All these variations are significant, at p-values of  0.000, which 
suggests that there is significant variation in the VRR at each level that can be explained by firm and 
country characteristics. 
The results for Model 1 suggest that the variations in VRR are significantly influenced by low 
levels of  volatility in firms’ market returns and high covariance of  the firms’ market returns relative to 
the market index, at p-values of  0.081, and 0.000, respectively. The results also show that large firms are 
likely to exhibit significantly higher levels of  variation in VRR, at p-values of  0.000. These results lead 
us to accept H1a. 
Model 1 also suggests that firm characteristics explain more two-thirds (as adjusted-R2) of  the 
total variations in VRR between firms across Germany, the UK and US. The ICC shows, though, that 
approximately 34% (33% in the intercept and 1% in time) occurs between firms across countries over 
the years. This suggests that expanding Model 1 to include country characteristics in Models 2 to 6 
might decrease the extant VRR variations, improving the model’s ability to explain such variations.  
Models 2 and 5 show that firms from common law countries, such as the UK and US, are likely 
to exhibit significantly higher levels of  VRR variations than firms from code law countries, such as 
Germany, at p-values of  0.000. Considering the cultural values, we find that firms from countries with 
lower scores for PD, UA, IND, and LTO are likely to exhibit significantly higher variations in VRR, at 
p-values of  0.000. We also find that firms from countries with lower MAS scores seem to exhibit less 
variation in VRR than firms from other countries, at p-values of  0.000. In the same table, we can see 
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that larger and less profitable firms, and those with higher systematic risk are likely to reveal 
significantly higher levels of  VRR than other firms at p-values of  0.000, 0.073 and 0.023, respectively. 
These results therefore support the acceptance of H1a. 
However, Models 2 to 6 show very limited improvements, in terms of  adjusted-R2, compared 
with Model 1; there is just a 5.2% increase in these models’ ability to explain variations in VRR between 
firms across Germany, the UK, and the US. These results suggest that such variations are more likely to 
be statistically correlated with firm characteristics that can be derived hypothetically based on managers’ 
incentives. In essence, we find that both legal and cultural factors have less influence than such 
incentives in explaining variations in VRR between firms across countries.10 Our results lead us to reject 
H2. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
5.3. Further analysis: Within country and financial crisis  
We separate the above (cross-country) analysis into each individual country (within-country analysis, 
with 1,000, 1,410, and 1,270 firm-year observations in Germany, the UK and the US, respectively), as 
specified in Eq. 2, and as shown in Table 6.  
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In Germany, firms characterised by higher systematic risk, a larger size, and less profitability are 
likely to exhibit high variation in MRR. Meanwhile, high variations in VRR are likely to be significantly 
associated with lower volatility of  market returns, higher systematic risk, higher financing risk, a larger 
size, and less profitability. In the UK, firm size and firm dividend, rather than risk levels, determine 
MRR variation. However, UK firms characterised by high systematic risk and a large size are likely to 
exhibit high variation in VRR. Finally, in the US, firms with highly volatile market returns, low liquidity 
                                                 
10 To investigate this conclusion further, we analyse the impact of both legal and cultural values on the two 
components of total MRR, namely MRR_I and MRR_V, in the US and Germany. The results (not reported) confirm the 
significant impact of the legal system on MRR_I but not on MRR_V, which in turn supports the theory that providing 
additional information about mandated risk is more likely to be associated with the incentives of the firms’ managers.  
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risk, a large size, low profitability and high growth exhibit significantly higher variation in MRR. Neither 
firm risk nor any other firm characteristic influences variation in VRR for US firms. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
These results suggest that, in Germany, variations in MRR and VRR reflect risk level variations 
(total, systematic, financing and liquidity risks). The results have many implications and support the 
respective regulatory approach adopted in each country by demonstrating the extent to which variations 
in MRR and VRR are more or less sensitive to variations in underlying risk. The UK results suggest 
that variations in VRR are more sensitive to a firm’s risk level (systematic) than are MRR variations, 
which are influenced by firm size and dividends. In the US, variations in MRR are more sensitive to 
variations in a firm’s risk levels (total and liquidity risks) than are variations in VRR. 
 To observe firms’ behaviour over the recent financial crisis (2007/2008), we introduce three 
dummy variables, representing the periods before, during and after the crisis in 2007/2008 (all take the 
value 1 during the period in question and 0 otherwise). Our ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
suggest that firms tend to behave differently prior to and following the crisis relative to during. The 
observed responses vary subject to the disclosure type, as shown under Models 1 and 4 of Table 7 for 
MRR and VRR respectively, and subject to the joint estimation, which interacts the crisis’s variables 
with country, as shown under Models 2 and 3 of Table 7. 
Specifically, Model 1 suggests that firms tend to comply more (less) with risk regulations post 
(pre)-crisis relative to during. Consistent with the neo-institutional theory, firms are likely to face a lot 
of pressure during and after crises, making the cost of non-compliance more severe (Oliver, 1991). 
Most firms will need to reassure the market about their financial performance and build trust in what 
they provide to the market. The results also suggest that US (UK) firms tend to exhibit more (less) risk 
information mandatorily than German firms. Model 2 of Table 7 confirms these findings when we look 
at the joint effects of the financial crisis (pre- and post- relative to during the crisis) and the countries 
under study (the UK and US relative to Germany). We find that both US and UK firms tend to comply 
more with the risk regulations following the crisis than during. This result suggests that firms are likely 
to continue exhibiting significantly higher levels of mandatory risk disclosure since those firms will be 
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under the markets’ and regulators’ attention. This, as a result, is likely to motivate such firms to apply 
effectively either current or any new emerged regulations. Model 3 of Table 7 suggests that firms are 
likely to provide less risk information voluntarily prior the crisis than they do during the crisis. The 
results also suggest that only UK firms are likely to exhibit higher levels of VRR than German firms. 
Model 4 confirms our findings under Model 3 and further explains that, while US firms tend to 
reassure the market with more voluntary risk information both before and after the crisis than during, 
UK firms are only likely to do so prior to the crisis.   
[Insert Table 7 about here]  
5.4. Robustness checks: Endogeneity problem  
We check whether our previous estimates, shown in Tables 5 and 6, are subject to an endogeneity 
problem arising from omitted variables and/or simultaneity. The problem of omitted variables bias 
arises from unobserved heterogeneity of a firm-specific and/or time-invariant nature. Omitted variables 
might lead us to incorrectly attribute variations in risk disclosure to the variations in firm and country 
characteristics. This concern, though, can be eliminated by using fixed effects (e.g., Brown, Beekes, and 
Verhoeven, 2011). Our estimated fixed effects in Tables 5 and 6 control for any firm-specific and time-
invariant effects that might influence a firm’s decision to include risk information in the narrative 
sections of its annual report. Simultaneity or reverse causality arises in situations where significant 
variations exist between the explanatory variables and risk reporting (MRR and VRR). In such cases, 
one might claim (e.g., Frith, 1984; Kothari, Li, and Short, 2009; Kravet and Muslu, 2013) that firms that 
disclose high levels of risk information are likely to be riskier. To control against reverse causality, 
following Hoitash et al. (2009), we regress the current year’s mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure 
scores on the previous year’s market and accounting risk measures, as shown in the following equation: 
2
0 1 2 1
1 1 1
tij ij ij tij ij tij rq q ijt o q q ij q ij tij ij
Q r Q o Q c
R R Z Z X f l X f l X c l r
cq
q q q
      

         
  
  (3) 
Our results, shown as Model 7 in Table 5 for MRR, and Table 6 for VRR, show that the 
coefficients of  the lagged values of  the market and accounting risk measures are statistically consistent 
with our results in Models 1 and 2, and have theoretically plausible signs. Moreover, the size of  the 
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coefficients and the explanatory power of  the model remain qualitatively similar to those in Model 1. 
Our results therefore support a firm’s risk level being an important factor in the variation in risk 
reporting. 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
 
We associate variations in both MRR and VRR with variations in both firm characteristics (firm risk 
levels and control variables) and country characteristics (legal system and cultural values), across 
Germany, the UK and the US, over the period from 2005 to 2010. We find that the legal system and 
cultural values have significantly high explanatory power over MRR variations over time, even under the 
new approach of  international convergence. They are less important in explaining the variations in 
VRR between firms across countries.  
These results have theoretical and practical implications. They suggest that more attention should 
be paid to variables that may explain the variations in MRR and/or VRR within firms over time. Our 
suggestion is consistent with a recent trend in the accounting literature (e.g., Bamber, Jiang, and Wang, 
2010) for research looking more deeply at the demographic characteristics of  managers (e.g., 
educational background, such as finance, accounting or legal; managers with military experience versus 
those without it). Bamber et al. (2010) find personal managerial styles to play a significant role in 
explaining the cross-sectional variations in voluntary financial disclosure, even after controlling for both 
economic and firm characteristics. The practical implication of  our results lies in our empirical evidence 
relevant to the current international convergence efforts. Each country’s legal system and cultural values 
should be considered in order to minimise divergences in the mandatory efforts. Also, managerial 
incentives within each country should be brought into play so as to minimise variations in their 
voluntary disclosure. Looking more closely at the variations in MRR and VRR within and between the 
firms in each country is useful for clearly identifying the extent to which the regulatory approach relies 
on either regulations (Germany and the US) or voluntary disclosure (the UK).  
When we analyse each country separately, we find that German firms pay closer attention to their 
risks by disclosing significantly high levels of  risk information mandatorily and/or voluntarily. 
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Furthermore, we find that UK firms pay closer attention to systematic risks than they pay to other 
risks, by disclosing significantly high levels of  risk information voluntarily rather mandatorily. 
Additionally, the US firms pay close attention to total and liquidity risks by disclosing significantly more 
risk information mandatorily rather voluntarily. These results have theoretical and practical implications. 
Our evidence adds significantly to the disclosure literature by emphasising the importance of  widening 
this research scope to pay more attention to variations above the mandated requirements (e.g., IFRS 
adoption), which provide a minimum amount of  information to investors, responding to the pressure 
of coercive or regulative factors, as the neo-institutional theory suggests. It warrants the extension of  
those studies that do not distinguish voluntary from mandatory risk reporting (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007) when studying the incentives behind risk reporting.   
In terms of  practical implications, first, the results signal that organising risk reporting by 
formally implementing an accounting standard significantly improves the disclosure environment by 
encouraging the provision of  more risk information either mandatorily or voluntarily, most importantly 
as a response to firm risk levels. Second, the results support the current trend in the UK regulations, 
which encourages firms to voluntarily disclose information about their risks rather than making such 
disclosure compulsory. Third, they support the regulatory trend in the US. US firms trust the market’s 
ability to correct any overestimations of  corporate uncertainties, and disclose more risk information.  
Further research could usefully include some other explanatory variables in the model, which 
might decrease the unsystematic (idiosyncratic) unexplained variations in MRR and VRR within firms 
over the period from 2005 to 2010 (e.g., see Bamber et al., 2010). Future research might usefully 
increase the number of  countries so as to account for higher levels of  analysis (three or four levels, see 
e.g. Hox, 2010; Dong and Stettler, 2011). Previous research has examined the quality of  aggregated risk 
reporting (e.g., Miihkinen, 2012); future research might investigate the comparative quality of  
mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure. 
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Tables and Figures  
 
Table 1. Summary of  variable definitions, measures and sources 
This table provides the definitions and measures of  risk reporting, as dependent variables, and firm and country 
characteristics, as independent variables. It also provides the source of  each variable. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all 
continuous variables are winsorised by eliminating observations at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Definition and measures Sources 
Panel A: Dependent variables: Mandatory and voluntary risk reporting 
MRR 
 
 
 
VRR 
Mandatory risk reporting is risk information provided by firms as a response to a specific regulation. It is 
measured by the natural logarithm of  the total number of  statements that indicate risk based on the final 
risk word list and that contain at least one topic related to the final mandated topics or themes. 
 
Voluntary risk reporting is risk information provided voluntarily, aside from any specific risk regulations. 
Measured as the natural logarithm of  the residual of  aggregated risk reporting (ARR) after excluding MRR. 
QSR version (6) 
 
 
 
QSR version (6) 
Panel B: Independent variables: Firm characteristics (firm risk levels and control variables) 
TR Total risk is the volatility of  market returns, measured by the standard deviation.  Datastream  
SR Systematic risk is the covariance of  a firm’s market return relative to a market index. The calculations are 
based on between 23 and 35 consecutive month-end prices of  German, UK and US firms relative to the 
market returns of  the FazAktien, FT All Share and S&P 500, respectively.  
Datastream  
USR Unsystematic risk is the volatility of  firm-specific risk, which is the standard deviation of  the standard error 
of  the CAPM. 
Datastream  
FR Financing risk is the extent to which firms have problems related to debt, measured by leverage proxied by 
the ratio of  total debt to total equity. 
Worldscope  
LR Liquidity risk is the extent to which firms have problems related to payments, measured by the current ratio, 
proxied by dividing total assets by total liabilities. 
Worldscope  
SE A firm’s size, measured by the natural logarithm of  total assets in local currency or US dollars. Worldscope  
PE A firm’s profitability, measured by dividing net income before proffered dividends by the year-end common 
equity.  
Worldscope  
GE A firm’s growth, measured by growth in earnings, or by the ratio of  net sales growth (NS1-NS0/NS0). 
 
Datastream, Worldscope  
DE A firm’s dividends, measured as dividend per share or dividend pay-out.  Worldscope  
LE The length of  the annual report, measured by the total number of  sentences coded in the whole annual 
report. 
SQR version (6) 
IE Based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), eight industries are provided: materials, industrials, 
consumer goods, health care, consumer services, telecommunication, utilities and technology.   
Thomson One Banker 
Panel C: Independent variables: Country characteristics (legal system and cultural values) 
LS A country’s legal system, measured as a dummy variable equal to 1 for common law (CML) and 0 for code 
law (CL) countries. 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Cultural dimensions 
 
Hofstede (1991, 2001)  
Germany UK US 
PD Power distance, which is the extent to which power is distributed equally within a society and the degree to 
which society accepts this distribution, from relatively equal to extremely unequal. 
35 35 40 
UA Uncertainty avoidance, which is the degree to which individuals in a country prefer structured over 
unstructured situations, from relatively flexible to extremely rigid, to cope with risk and innovation; a low 
uncertainty culture emphasises a higher level of  standardisation. 
65 35 46 
IND Individualism, which is the degree to which individuals base their actions on self-interest versus the interests 
of  the group. 
67 89 91 
MAS Masculinity, which is a measure of  a society's goal orientation: a masculine culture emphasises status derived 
from wages and position; a feminine culture emphasises human relations and quality of  life.   
66 66 62 
LTO Long-term orientation, which is the extent to which the society respects traditional, forward thinking. 31 25 29 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics for all of  the variables defined in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix (Pearson above diagonal and Spearman below)                                  
 
This table shows the correlation analysis between the risk reporting variables and firm characteristics. The numbers above 
the diagonal are the linear Pearson coefficients; the numbers below the diagonal are the Spearman coefficients, and the p-
values are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (all two-tailed). All 
variables are defined in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Germany   UK  USA 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Median N Mean Standard  
deviation 
Median N Mean Standard  
deviation 
Median N 
MRR 1.909 0.423 2.000 838 1.443 0.285 1.477 1,317 2.281 0.324 2.350 1,265 
VRR 2.289 0.253 2.286 838 2.337 0.210 2.354 1,320 2.263 0.192 2.281 1,265 
TR 0.505 0.263 0.526 841 0.333 0.282 0.244 1,321 0.647 0.251 0.697 1,265 
SR 0.383 0.242 0.360 841 0.523 0.266 0.521 1,321 0.555 0.300 0.594 1,265 
USR 0.435 0.262 0.345 841 0.385 0.256 0.468 1,321 0.661 0.242 0.686 1,265 
FR 0.534 0.259 0.531 837 0.590 0.278 0.633 1,315 0.378 0.273 0.321 1,254 
LR 0.503 0.259 0.527 830 0.351 0.248 0.314 1,306 0.650 0.270 0.724 1,261 
SE 0.465 0.309 0.426 840 0.654 0.220 0.675 1,291 0.369 0.257 0.324 1,221 
PE 0.495 0.259 0.484 829 0.613 0.271 0.660 1,263 0.388 0.280 0.332 1,204 
GE 0.453 0.220 0.439 840 0.518 0.341 0.591 1,300 0.495 0.263 0.495 1,238 
DE 0.553 0.270 0.594 769 0.684 0.222 0.728 1,093 0.299 0.158 0.238 1,159 
LE  3.234 0.213 3.235 841 3.160 0.188 3.1629 1,321 3.190 0.146 3.199 1,265 
 MRR VRR TR SR USR FR LR SE PE GE DE 
MRR  0.207*** 
(0.000) 
-0.451*** 
(0.000) 
0.135*** 
(0.000) 
0.261*** 
(0.000) 
-0.161*** 
(0.000) 
0.310*** 
(0.000) 
0.135*** 
(0.000) 
-0.294*** 
(0.000) 
-0.021* 
(0.224) 
-0.429*** 
(0.000) 
VRR 0.194*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.103*** 
(0.000) 
0.137*** 
(0.000) 
-0.101*** 
(0.000) 
0.183*** 
(0.000) 
-0.153*** 
(0.000) 
0.374*** 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.636) 
-0.029* 
(0.094) 
-0.102*** 
(0.000) 
TR 0.358*** 
(0.000) 
-0.133*** 
(0.000) 
 0.419*** 
(0.000) 
0.447*** 
(0.000) 
-0.303*** 
(0.000) 
0.319*** 
(0.000) 
-0.461*** 
(0.000) 
-0.378*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
-0.566*** 
(0.000) 
SR 0.142*** 
(0.000) 
0.142*** 
(0.000) 
0.419*** 
(0.000) 
 0.167*** 
(0.000) 
-0.096*** 
(0.000) 
0.071*** 
(0.000) 
0.048** 
(0.005) 
-0.157*** 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.337) 
-0.177*** 
(0.000) 
USR 0.279*** 
(0.000) 
-0.125*** 
(0.000) 
0.447*** 
(0.000) 
0.167*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.198*** 
(0.000) 
0.259*** 
(0.000) 
-0.368*** 
(0.000) 
-0.376*** 
(0.000) 
-0.052*** 
(0.002) 
-0.433*** 
(0.000) 
FR -0.177*** 
(0.000) 
0.204*** 
(0.000) 
-0.304*** 
(0.000) 
-0.096*** 
(0.000) 
-0.198*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.499*** 
(0.000) 
0.396*** 
(0.000) 
0.116*** 
(0.000) 
-0.048** 
(0.014) 
-0.263** 
(0.000) 
LR 0.325*** 
(0.000) 
-0.180*** 
(0.000) 
0.320*** 
(0.000) 
0.072*** 
(0.000) 
0.259*** 
(0.000) 
-0.499*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.379*** 
(0.000) 
-0.229*** 
(0.000) 
0.009 
(0.593) 
-0.337*** 
(0.000) 
SE 0.153*** 
(0.000) 
0.431*** 
(0.000) 
-0.460*** 
(0.000) 
0.047*** 
(0.000) 
-0.368*** 
(0.000) 
0.397*** 
(0.000) 
-0.379*** 
(0.000) 
 0.286*** 
(0.000) 
0.023 
(0.138) 
0.387*** 
(0.000) 
PE -0.306*** 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.832) 
-0.378*** 
(0.000) 
-0.157*** 
(0.000) 
-0.376*** 
(0.000) 
0.117*** 
(0.000) 
-0.230*** 
(0.000) 
0.286*** 
(0.000) 
 0.172*** 
(0.000) 
0.441*** 
(0.000) 
GE -0.022 
(0.209) 
-0.023 
(0.182) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.016* 
(0.063) 
-0.053** 
(0.002) 
-0.048** 
(0.013) 
0.009 
(0.345) 
0.022 
(0.139) 
0.172*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.025 
(0.175) 
DE -0.447*** 
(0.000) 
0.111*** 
(0.000) 
-0.566*** 
(0.000) 
-0.179*** 
(0.000) 
-0.432*** 
(0.000) 
0.264*** 
(0.000) 
-0.339*** 
(0.000) 
0.385*** 
(0.000) 
0.431*** 
(0.000) 
-0.025 
(0.165) 
 
LE 0.447*** 
(0.000) 
0.770*** 
(0.000) 
-0.018 
(0.288) 
0.113*** 
(0.000) 
-0.053*** 
(0.002) 
0.140*** 
(0.000) 
-0.087*** 
(0.000) 
0.318*** 
(0.000) 
-0.065*** 
(0.000) 
-0.013 
(0.459) 
-0.008 
(0.673) 
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Table 4. Estimates of  fixed and covariance effects of  the repeated measures multilevel analysis for mandatory risk reporting  
 
 
 
 
 Null Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 
Intercept 1.785*** 
(0.000) 
-1.044*** 
(0.000) 
-0.875*** 
(0.000) 
-0.875*** 
(0.000) 
-0.875*** 
(0.000) 
-1.703*** 
(0.000) 
-0.875*** 
(0.000) 
-0.227*** 
(0.000) 
Total risk   0.071** 
(0.038) 
-0.001 
(0.970) 
-0.001 
(0.970) 
-0.001 
(0.970) 
-0.001 
(0.970) 
-0.001 
(0.970) 
-0.029 
(0.321) 
Systematic risk   -0.014 
(0.563) 
0.069*** 
(0.003) 
0.069*** 
(0.003) 
0.069*** 
(0.003) 
0.069*** 
(0.003) 
0.069*** 
(0.003) 
0.048** 
(0.038) 
Unsystematic risk   0.085** 
(0.017) 
-0.028 
(0.301) 
-0.028 
(0.301) 
-0.028 
(0.301) 
-0.028 
(0.301) 
-0.028 
(0.301) 
-0.012 
(0.650) 
Financing risk   -0.045 
(0.144) 
0.001 
(0.996) 
0.001 
(0.996) 
0.001 
(0.996) 
0.001 
(0.996) 
0.001 
(0.996) 
0.0562 
(0.260) 
Liquidity risk  0.109*** 
(0.000) 
0.034 
(0.200) 
0.034 
(0.200) 
0.034 
(0.200) 
0.034 
(0.200) 
0.034 
(0.200) 
0.056* 
(0.053) 
Size effect  0.119** 
(0.013) 
0.120*** 
(0.000) 
0.120*** 
(0.000) 
0.120*** 
(0.000) 
0.120*** 
(0.000) 
0.120*** 
(0.000) 
0.160*** 
(0.000) 
Profitability effect  -0.070*** 
(0.006) 
-0.058** 
(0.011) 
-0.058** 
(0.011) 
-0.058** 
(0.011) 
-0.058** 
(0.011) 
-0.058** 
(0.011) 
-0.063*** 
(0.007) 
Growth effect  0.028 
(0.104) 
0.032* 
(0.051) 
0.032* 
(0.051) 
0.032* 
(0.051) 
0.032* 
(0.051) 
0.032* 
(0.051) 
0.035** 
(0.038) 
Dividend effect  -0.180*** 
(0.000) 
0.031 
(0.287) 
0.031 
(0.287) 
0.031 
(0.287) 
0.031 
(0.287) 
0.031 
(0.287) 
0.032 
(0.312) 
Length effect  1.006*** 
(0.000) 
0.941*** 
(0.000) 
0.941*** 
(0.000) 
0.941*** 
(0.000) 
0.941*** 
(0.000) 
0.941*** 
(0.000) 
0.757*** 
(0.000) 
Time 0.031*** 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
0.013*** 
(0.000) 
0.013*** 
(0.000) 
0.013*** 
(0.000) 
 0.013*** 
(0.000) 
0.026*** 
(0.000) 
Legal system    -0.417*** 
(0.000) 
0.410*** 
(0.000) 
0.410*** 
(0.000) 
-0.417*** 
(0.000) 
0.410*** 
(0.000) 
-0.462*** 
(0.000) 
Power distance  
 
  -0.828*** 
(0.000) 
    -0.841*** 
(0.000) 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
 
   -0.828*** 
(0.000) 
 
    
Individualism  
 
    0.828*** 
(0.000) 
 
   
Masculinity  
 
     0.828*** 
(0.000) 
  
Long-term 
orientation 
      -0.828*** 
(0.000) 
 
Industry effect  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Quadratic time 0.003 
 (0.233) 
Excluded  Excluded  Excluded  Excluded  Excluded  Excluded  Excluded 
ICC (VRM) 21%*** 
(0.000) 
35%*** 
(0.000) 
77%*** 
(0.000) 
77%*** 
(0.000) 
77%*** 
(0.000) 
77%*** 
(0.000) 
77%*** 
(0.000) 
77%*** 
(0.000) 
ICC (VI) 78%*** 
(0.000) 
62%*** 
(0.000) 
22%*** 
(0.000) 
22%*** 
(0.000) 
22%*** 
(0.000) 
22%*** 
(0.000) 
22%*** 
(0.000) 
22%*** 
(0.000) 
ICC (VT) 1%*** 
(0.000) 
3%*** 
(0.000) 
1%*** 
(0.000) 
1%*** 
(0.000) 
1%*** 
(0.000) 
1%*** 
(0.000) 
1%*** 
(0.000) 
1% 
(0.241) 
Adjusted-R2 (VI)  51.2% 79.2% 79.2% 79.2% 79.2% 79.2% 80.6% 
Change -2LL 
Change chi-square 
 685.48*** 
(0.000) 
800.52*** 
(0.000) 
800.52*** 
(0.000) 
800.52*** 
(0.000) 
800.52*** 
(0.000) 
800.52*** 
(0.000) 
869.22*** 
(0.000) 
N-S 
Ob 
723 
3,615 
723 
3,615 
723 
3,615 
723 
3,615 
723 
3,615 
723 
3,615 
723 
3,615 
723 
3,615 
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This table identifies the extent to which the firm and country characteristics are significantly related to MRR variations. It 
provides the results of  two repeated measures multilevel analyses of  the MRR. It gives the fixed and covariance estimates of  
the predictors using six models. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (all one-tailed except 
when the sign is not predicted or mixed). The null model shows the impact of  both (non-)linear components of  time on 
MRR. This model also describes the shape of  the firm’s MRR trajectories and determines whether the initial intercept and 
the random slope of  time vary across firms or not. The following models show how the predictive variables explain the 
variation in MRR within and between firms across the US, the UK and Germany. Model 1 explores the impact of  firm 
characteristics, including firm risk levels and some control variables, on the MRR variations. The subsequent models (2 to 6) 
include the interaction between firm and country characteristics, including the legal system and Hofstede’s five dimensions 
of culture; each model combines the legal system with one of  those five dimensions. Model 7 introduces the lagged values 
of  market and accounting risk measures in order to account for endogeneity. This table also shows the ICC (the intra-class 
correlation), which gives the proportion of  variation at each level by dividing each level’s variation by the total variation. 
Level 1 gives the variance of  repeated measures (VRM) within firms over the five years (our time series), and level 2 the 
variance between firms, either on the intercepts (VI) or over time (VT). The calculation for level 1, for instance, is σ2 of  level 
1/ (σ2   of  level 1 + σ2 of  level 2). R2 explains the extent to which the overall model’s predictors can implicitly explain the 
changes in MRR, and is calculated as (σ2 M1- σ2 M2/ σ2 M1). Hence, M1 is the null model’s variance component, whereas 
M2 refers to the current model’s predictors. Adjusted-R2 is calculated as 1-(1-R2)*n-1/n-k-1, where n is the total sample size 
and k is the total number of  parameters. The change in -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) is employed to assess each model’s 
improvement over the null model, and the change in chi-square is used to examine such improvements statistically. The p-
values of  the t- and Wald Z-statistics are given in parentheses. N-S is the number of  subjects under analysis and Ob is the 
number of  observations of  firm-years. All other variables’ interpretations are as explained in Table 1. 
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Table 5. Estimates of  fixed and covariance effects of  the repeated measures multilevel analysis for voluntary risk reporting 
 
This table provides the two repeated measures multilevel analyses of  voluntary risk reporting (VRR) across Germany, the 
UK and the US. All variables’ interpretations are as explained in the previous table. 
 Null Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 
Intercept 2.230*** 
(0.000) 
-0.041* 
(0.066) 
-0.178* 
(0.075) 
-0.178* 
(0.075) 
-0.178* 
(0.075) 
-0.087 
(0.380) 
-0.178* 
(0.075) 
0.150 
(0.181) 
Total risk   -0.027* 
(0.081) 
-0.001 
(0.993) 
-0.001 
(0.993) 
-0.001 
(0.993) 
-0.001 
(0.993) 
-0.001 
(0.993) 
-0.023 
(0.172) 
Systematic risk   0.049*** 
(0.000) 
0.026** 
(0.023) 
0.026** 
(0.023) 
0.026** 
(0.023) 
0.026** 
(0.023) 
0.026** 
(0.023) 
0.017** 
(0.028) 
Unsystematic risk   0.033 
(0.817) 
0.006 
(0.629) 
0.006 
(0.629) 
0.006 
(0.629) 
0.006 
(0.629) 
0.006 
(0.629) 
0.014 
(0.334) 
Financing risk   0.014 
(0.282) 
0.016 
(0.204) 
0.016 
(0.204) 
0.016 
(0.204) 
0.016 
(0.204) 
0.016 
(0.204) 
0.022 
(0.137) 
Liquidity risk  -0.007 
(0.955) 
0.015 
(0.255) 
0.015 
(0.255) 
0.015 
(0.255) 
0.015 
(0.255) 
0.015 
(0.255) 
0.010 
(0.560) 
Size effect  0.082*** 
(0.000) 
0.049*** 
(0.004) 
0.049*** 
(0.004) 
0.049*** 
(0.004) 
0.049*** 
(0.004) 
0.049*** 
(0.004) 
0.081*** 
(0.000) 
Profitability effect  -0.014 
(0.221) 
-0.021* 
(0.073) 
-0.021* 
(0.073) 
-0.021* 
(0.073) 
-0.021* 
(0.073) 
-0.021* 
(0.073) 
-0.040*** 
(0.004) 
Growth effect  -0.004 
(0.557) 
-0.010 
(0.212) 
-0.010 
(0.212) 
-0.010 
(0.212) 
-0.010 
(0.212) 
-0.010 
(0.212) 
-0.002 
(0.816) 
Dividend effect  0.012 
(0.387) 
-0.011 
(0.454) 
-0.011 
(0.454) 
-0.011 
(0.454) 
-0.011 
(0.454) 
-0.011 
(0.454) 
-0.014 
(0.419) 
Length effect  0.766*** 
(0.000) 
0.806*** 
(0.000) 
0.806*** 
(0.000) 
0.806*** 
(0.000) 
0.806*** 
(0.000) 
0.806*** 
(0.000) 
0.687*** 
(0.000) 
Time 0.059*** 
(0.000) 
0.011* 
(0.056) 
0.0117** 
(0.027) 
0.011** 
(0.027) 
0.011** 
(0.027) 
0.011** 
(0.027) 
0.011** 
(0.027) 
0.012** 
(0.025) 
Legal system    0.102*** 
(0.000) 
0.012 
(0.255) 
0.012 
(0.255) 
0.102*** 
(0.000) 
0.012 
(0.255) 
0.116*** 
(0.000) 
Power distance  
 
  0.090*** 
(0.000) 
    0.098*** 
(0.000) 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
 
   0.090*** 
(0.000) 
    
Individualism  
 
    0.090*** 
(0.000) 
   
Masculinity  
 
     -0.090*** 
(0.000) 
  
Long-term 
orientation 
 
      0.090*** 
(0.000) 
 
Industry effect  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Quadratic time -0.008*** 
(0.000) 
Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
ICC (VRM) 51%*** 
(0.000) 
66%*** 
(0.000) 
70%*** 
(0.000) 
70%*** 
(0.000) 
70%*** 
(0.000) 
70%*** 
(0.000) 
70%*** 
(0.000) 
73% 
(0.000) 
ICC (VI) 46%*** 
(0.000) 
33%*** 
(0.000) 
29%*** 
(0.000) 
29%*** 
(0.000) 
29%*** 
(0.000) 
29%*** 
(0.000) 
29%*** 
(0.000) 
26% 
(0.000) 
ICC (VT) 3%*** 
(0.000) 
1%*** 
(0.000) 
1%*** 
(0.000) 
1%*** 
(0.000) 
1%*** 
(0.000) 
1%*** 
(0.000) 
1%*** 
(0.000) 
1% 
(0.000) 
Adjusted-R2 (VI)  69.9% 75.1% 75.1% 75.1% 75.1% 75.1% 72.1% 
Change -2LL 
Change chi-square 
 1061.61*** 
(0.000) 
73.99*** 
(0.000) 
73.99*** 
(0.000) 
73.99*** 
(0.000)) 
73.99*** 
(0.000) 
73.99*** 
(0.000) 
300.81*** 
(0.000) 
N-S 
Ob 
724 
3,620 
724 
3,620 
724 
3,620 
724 
3,620 
724 
3,620 
724 
3,620 
724 
3,685 
724 
3,685 
38 
 
Table 6. Estimates of  the fixed and covariance effects of  the repeated measures multilevel analysis for the mandatory and voluntary risk reporting variations  
 Germany   UK  USA 
Mandatory risk reporting Voluntary risk reporting  Mandatory risk reporting Voluntary risk reporting  Mandatory risk reporting Voluntary risk reporting 
Null  Model Model 1 Null Model Model 1  Null  Model Model 1 
 
Null  Model Model 1 
 
 
 
Null Model Model 1 
 
Null Model Model 1 
Intercept 1.782*** 
(0.000) 
-1.607*** 
(0.000) 
2.238*** 
(0.000) 
0.200 
(0.405) 
1.418*** 
(0.000) 
-1.016*** 
(0.000) 
2.213*** 
(0.000) 
-0.137 
(0.189) 
2.184*** 
(0.000) 
-1.785*** 
(0.000) 
2.245*** 
(0.000) 
-0.526** 
(0.017) 
Total risk   -0.108 
(0.143) 
 -0.105** 
(0.011) 
 -0.002 
(0.959) 
 -0.004 
(0.804) 
 0.103* 
(0.051) 
 0.025 
(0.354) 
Systematic risk   0.237*** 
(0.000) 
 0.122*** 
(0.001) 
 0.021 
(0.506) 
 0.036*** 
(0.005) 
 0.003 
(0.926) 
 0.007 
(0.667) 
Unsystematic risk   0.014 
(0.828) 
 0.028 
(0.457) 
 -0.014 
(0.657) 
 0.003 
(0.799) 
 -0.070 
(0.152) 
 0.120 
(0.678) 
Financing risk   0.022 
(0.786) 
 0.108** 
(0.018) 
 -0.026 
(0.403) 
 0.015 
(0.235) 
 0.023 
(0.567) 
 -0.218 
(0.319) 
Liquidity risk  0.046 
(0.541) 
 0.057 
(0.179) 
 0.007 
(0.825) 
 0.016 
(0.213) 
 0.075* 
(0.065) 
 0.025 
(0.991) 
Size effect  0.186** 
(0.045) 
 0.296*** 
(0.037) 
 0.232*** 
(0.000) 
 0.134*** 
(0.000) 
 0.103** 
(0.048) 
 0.020 
(0.490) 
Profitability effect  -0.097* 
(0.093) 
 -0.066** 
(0.035 
 -0.020 
(0.518) 
 0.016 
(0.188) 
 -0.057* 
(0.097) 
 -0.021 
(0.245) 
Growth effect  0.097 
(0.110) 
 0.032 
 (0.311) 
 -0.011 
(0.532) 
 -0.011 
(0.131) 
 0.072** 
(0.012) 
 -0.012 
(0.422) 
Dividend effect  -0.055 
(0.331) 
 -0.006 
(0.855) 
 0.080** 
(0.049) 
 0.007 
(0.923) 
 -0.060 
(0.355) 
 0.034 
(0.340) 
Length effect  0.979*** 
(0.000) 
 0.713*** 
(0.000) 
 0.821*** 
(0.000) 
 765*** 
(0.000) 
 1.055*** 
(0.000) 
 0.901*** 
(0.000) 
Time 0.025** 
(0.027) 
-0.025** 
(0.274) 
0.061*** 
(0.000) 
0.024* 
(0.058) 
-0.019** 
(0.015) 
-0.097*** 
(0.000) 
0.102*** 
(0.000) 
0.028*** 
(0.000) 
0.080*** 
(0.002) 
0.067*** 
(0.000) 
0.095** 
(0.024) 
-0.017** 
(0.042) 
Industry effect  Included   Included   Included   Included   Included  Included  
Time quadratic 0.014** 
(0.016) 
Included -0.012*** 
(0.000) 
Included 0.010*** 
(0.001) 
Included -0.013*** 
(0.000) 
Included -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
included -0.002 
(0.940) 
Excluded 
ICC (VRM) 61%*** 
(0.000) 
70%*** 
(0.000) 
45% 
(0.000) 
85%*** 
(0.000) 
49%*** 
(0.000) 
77%*** 
(0.000) 
31%*** 
(0.000) 
58%*** 
(0.000) 
61% 
(0.000) 
65%*** 
(0.000) 
38%*** 
(0.000) 
59%*** 
(0.000) 
ICC (VI) 38%*** 29%*** 54%*** 
(0.000) 
13%*** 
(0.000) 
50%*** 22%*** 66%*** 
(0.000) 
37%*** 
(0.000) 
39%*** 35%*** 61%*** 41%*** 
(0.000) 
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This table provides the results of  the two repeated measures multilevel analyses of  MRR and VRR for each country. All variables’ interpretations are as explained for the previous table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ICC (VT) 1%** 
(0.025) 
1% 
(0.839) 
1% 
(0.232) 
2%* 
(0.065) 
1%*** 
(0.000) 
1% 
(0.423) 
3%*** 
(0.000) 
5% 
(0.353) 
    
Adjusted-R2 (VI)  49.8%  82.1%  70.9%  81.6%  79.3%  62.9% 
Changes -2LL 
Change chi-square 
 263.86*** 
(0.000) 
 288.78*** 
(0.000) 
 148.81*** 
(0.000) 
 853.25*** 
(0.000) 
 204.21*** 
(0.000) 
 78.13*** 
(0.000) 
N-S 
Ob 
196 
980 
196 
980 
196 
980 
196 
980 
281 
1,405 
281 
1,405 
281 
1,405 
281 
1,405 
246 
1,230 
246 
1,230 
246 
1,230 
246 
1,230 
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Table 7. OLS Regressions of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting before and after the financial crisis 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on the factors that influence mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosures prior to and following the recent financial crisis. We introduce three dummy variables, representing the periods 
before, during and after the crisis in 2007/2008 (all take the value 1 during the period in question and 0 otherwise). Before 
and after the crisis in UK and US are the joint effects of  the period of  before and after the crisis with UK and US dummies. 
All variables’ interpretations are as explained for the previous table. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively (all one-tailed except when the sign is not predicted or mixed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mandatory  risk reporting  Voluntary risk reporting 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -1.013*** -1.018***  -0.328** -0.306*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total risk -0.029 -0.013 0.012 0.009 
 (0.324) (0.644) (0.487) (0.512) 
Systematic risk 0.138*** 0.123*** 0.109* 0.022* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.100) 
Unsystematic risk -0.020 -0.023 0.008 0.008 
 (0.361) (0.289) (0.498) (0.472) 
Financing risk 0.025 0.025 0.012 0.012 
 (0.289) (0.273) (0.376) (0.367) 
Liquidity risk 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Size effect 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Profitability effect -0.076*** -0.079*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) 
Growth effect 0.039** 0.047*** -0.009 -0.012 
 (0.032) (0.000) (0.339) (0.256) 
Dividend effect 0.010 0.004 -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.754) (0.146) (0.610) (0.682) 
Length effect 0.858*** 0.869*** 0.794*** 0.792*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Before  the crisis -0.031** -0.102*** -0.026*** -0.038** 
 (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) 
After the  crisis 0.041** 0.101** -0.021* -0.067** 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.054) (0.021) 
UK dummy -0.429*** -0.477*** 0.113*** 0.101*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
US dummy 0.398*** 0.367*** 0.009 -0.024 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.392) (0.169) 
Before the crisis in UK  -0.116**  0.001 
  (0.024)  (0.951) 
After the crisis in UK  0.144***  0.062* 
  (0.003)  (0.051) 
Before  the crisis in  US  -0.072  0.033* 
  (0.136)  (0.094) 
After the crisis in US  0.068*  0.069** 
  (0.065)  (0.029) 
Industry-fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Correct for heteroskedasticity Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted-R2  68.7% 69.1% 57.6% 57.8% 
F-value 429.32*** 370.87*** 72.21*** 71.48*** 
Observations 3,026 3,026 3,030 3,030 
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Figure 1. Steps of  the automated content analysis used to measure MRR and VRR 
 
This figure provides details of how we constructed our word list and calculated the MRR and VRR scores using QSR 
version 6 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Identifying the risk word list 
Identifying the final risk word list 
Adopting the final word list of  
Elshandidy et al. (2013) 
2. Designing the command 
file 
3. QSR version (6) output MRR_V 
Searching outside mandated sections 
(USA and Germany) or whole annual 
reports in the UK 
All sentences containing at least one word indicating risk, either mandatorily or voluntarily 
Examining this list within each 
country’s context 
Searching inside mandated 
sections in the US and German 
annual reports narratives. 
Mainly mandatory risk 
disclosures (MRR_I) 
Aggregated risk reporting (ARR), 
contains voluntary (VRR) and 
mandatory (MRR_V) risk disclosures  
Interaction between  
ARR and MRR 
VRR 
 Total MRR 
